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science must no longer be strewn with the corpses of dead theologians.

God, the Creator and Lord of All. By SAMUEL HARRIS, D. D., LL. D. New York, 1896. Two volumes, pp. 579 and 576.

Apart from the interest generally extending to allied departments when a mature professor carefully edits the substance of oft-repeated lecture courses, there is a special interest attaching to this work not only because of the ability of the author, but on account of a growing new and wide-spread interest in his theme. The scope is broad, Part I treating God as the only absolute Spirit; II, Creator; III, Providence; IV, as a moral Governor. The prominence given to sentiment and feeling not only in the last, but in each of the other parts, is a prominent feature.

Jesus Christ before His Ministry. By EDOUARD STAPPER. Tr. by L. S. Houghton. New York, Scribner, 1896, pp. 182.

The childhood, early beliefs, temple period, first impressions and experiences, study and reading, Pharisees, Essenes, etc., are pleasantly and conjecturally described, with archæological details and a faint historic background. Jesus was small, plain, simply dressed, with striped mantle, staff and turban, and filled with the one great original conception of full unmovable and conscious union with God. The picture is very vivid in externals.

History of Philosophy. By ALFRED WEBER. Tr. by Frank Thilly, A. M., Ph. D., 1896, pp. 630.

This is a welcome text-book, on the whole better, as it is somewhat larger, than Schuyler's hitherto incomparable little hand-book. It begins with the Greeks and ends with Schopenhauer, Darwin and Comte. The points of view are often new and striking, while those emphasized in other brief histories of philosophy are often quite passed by. The author is clear and concise, is not doctrinaire, but broad in his sympathies, and in general his book will probably slowly supersede Schuyler's, as, we say with some sadness and reluctance, it should.

Infallible Logic: A Visible and Automatic System of Reasoning. By THOMAS D. HOWLEY of the Chicago Bar. Lansing, 1896, pp. 659.

The universe of discourse is represented by a reasoning frame, in which a simple system of signs and capital letters for positive signs and small letters for negative ones, a line for *and*, etc., is made use of in a way designed to help lawyers, ministers, teachers and students to eliminate all fallacy from their thinking. This system is said to do away with all doubt and uncertainty.

II.—REVIEWS.

Analytic Psychology. By G. F. STOUT. Macmillan & Co. Two vols., pp. 595. \$5.50. Library of Philosophy, edited by J. H. Muirhead.

In his preface Prof. Stout states that when he first planned the present work, it was his intention to follow the genetic order of treatment, but he found himself driven to pave the way for genetic treatment by analytical investigation. The "Analytic Psychology"

must therefore be regarded "as a fragment of a larger whole." He acknowledges special indebtedness among others to Dr. James Ward and Mr. F. H. Bradley; and the reader will easily recognize, even in a hasty review of the work, the influence of these two writers.

The introductory chapter defines psychology as "the positive science of mental process;" "positive" is here used to indicate that psychology "investigates matters of fact, instead of laying down canons of criticism." In the sections on the data and hypotheses of psychology, the necessary distinction and legitimate connection between psychology and physiology are clearly and carefully defined. The two important hypotheses that have been the outgrowth from introspective data are stated to be: (1) the doctrine of *Psychical Dispositions*; and (2) the doctrine of *Sub-consciousness*. The author criticises adversely the attempt to make the latter theory fulfill the office of the former in explaining the whole system of our mental experience. The importance of psychical dispositions "as an indispensable factor in mental process throughout conscious life" is frequently brought out in the course of the work.

The whole work proposed by Prof. Stout includes three books, with the following headings: I. A general analysis of consciousness. II. The laws of mental process. III. The origin and growth of certain products of mental process. The present treatise takes up the first two topics, leaving the third for a future work.

The first chapter of the "General Analysis" treats of "The Method and Principle of Division of Ultimate Mental Functions." Prof. Stout follows Brentano in making the positive principle of division "the mode in which consciousness refers to an object." He asserts that the triple division of mental functions has been ordinarily received without any adequate justification of the classification. (I, p. 39.) Although he accepts Brentano's principle, Prof. Stout arrives at somewhat different results. Brentano makes a threefold division into presentation, judgment or belief, and interest or liking. Prof. Stout, on the other hand, maintains that the fundamental division is that which distinguishes the cognitive, the conative, and the pleasure-pain attitudes of consciousness, and regards presentation and judgment merely as sub-divisions under cognition.

In order to explain and establish the fundamental principle adopted in this chapter, the author should have expounded clearly his use of the words "reference to an object;" but the pages devoted to this topic (I, pp. 40-46) seem to us to contain several obscure passages. At one time he defines an object as "an appearance in consciousness; what Brentano would call a content of presentation." (I, p. 41.) On the next page he says, "Thus, even according to the sensational idealism of Mill, we must deny that the perceived object is a content of consciousness;" and on the next page he adds, "Throughout the whole of this discussion the word 'object' is used as correlative with thought; its actual existence or non-existence is a matter of indifference." We look in vain for any discussion of the construction and nature of this "object." Possibly it is reserved for the promised "Genetic Psychology," but we think it is needed here. One point, however, the author makes clear, viz., that any single experience is not a mere momentary appearance in consciousness. It is invested with attributes and relations which are not themselves immediately experienced at the moment.

In accordance with his fundamental principle, Prof. Stout analyzes cognition into two constituents: "(1) A thought-reference

to something which, as the thinker means or intends it, is not a mere modification of his individual consciousness. (2) A more or less specific modification of his individual consciousness, which defines or determines, the direction of thought to this or that special object. This special mode of subjective experience we may call a presentation." (I, p. 47.) When the presentation is relatively independent of the thought-reference, we have mere "Sentience or *anoetic* consciousness." (I, p. 50.) The other two fundamental cognitive modes are simple apprehension and belief. The chapters discussing these modes show in a marked degree the influence of Bradley's Principle of Logic, and will be of special interest to those who are seeking for psychological analyses of logical terms.

The last chapter of Book I passes to the consideration of "Feeling and Conation." "Every mental attitude which partakes of the nature of volition includes two modes of reference to an object,—(1) being pleased or displeased with it or its absence, and (2) striving after it or striving to avoid it,—desire or aversion." This chapter contains a suggestive discussion of the relation between conation and attention, and of the characteristics of voluntary action.

The second book opens with a chapter on the concept of mental activity, which brushes away many of the cobwebs that have gathered about the term. Following Bradley's suggestion, our author regards it as applicable to those cases in which we are dealing with "immanent causality," or in which the "return of causal process upon itself is especially prominent or important." The physiological correlates for the passive and active sides of consciousness are found "in the disturbance of neural equilibrium from without," and "in the spontaneous tendency to recover from the disturbance in certain specific ways determined by the constitution of the nervous system." (I, p. 151.)

The mental process first treated is that of attention. In the two chapters devoted to this process the most characteristic sections are those on the teleological aspect, the inhibitive aspect, and the physiological correlate of the attention process. The last two sections are a good complement to such discussions of attention as those by Wundt and Külpe. The inhibitive aspect,—or the basis for the unity of attention,—is regarded from a purely psychological point of view. The physiological correlate of attention, suggested only as an hypothesis, is an adaptation of Dr. Hughlings Jackson's theory of high and low level centres. (I, pp. 198-200.) The hypothesis is more consistently developed than any other with which we are familiar.

In the next two chapters the most important line of thought is that which traces the comparative rank and function of association, and of what the author calls "noetic synthesis." The argument deserves careful consideration, but within our present limits we can only indicate the author's general position by the following quotation from his final remarks: "It may be said that at present the psychological world is divided into two camps: on the one side are the champions of association, on the other the champions of apperception. In the present chapter I have definitely sided with the second party. I cannot find in association, in the widest sense of the word, the sole ultimate form of cognitive combination." (II, p. 41.) At the same time the author maintains that "his position is not open to the objections brought by such critics as Münsterberg against that of Wundt;" for "his conception of noetic synthesis as a schematic apprehension of a whole recognizes it as a distinct content of consciousness and a distinct factor in

mental process." We think the same may be said of Wundt's conception as he explains it in his fourth edition in the concluding sections of the chapter on *Aufmerksamkeit und Apperception*.

In chapter VI, under the title "Relative Suggestion," the author considers that aspect of association, and especially of association as controlled by noetic synthesis, which appears in its most developed forms in reasoning and constructive imagination. 'Some of our most distinguished modern psychologists have shown a strong disposition to recognize in the elementary processes of perception and association the rudimentary presence of higher mental operations.' (II, p. 43.) "The fundamental fallacy of the associationists, as exposed by Mr. Bradley, lies in their bias towards psychological atomism. Behind this tendency there lies an obstinate disposition to explain the nature and existence of a whole exclusively by reference to the nature and existence of the parts which are combined in it. From this primary fallacy there flow three derivative errors:" . . . (1) 'The exclusive emphasis laid on mere combination. (2) The failure to recognize the apprehension of synthetic form. (3) The disposition to regard mental elements into combinations without themselves undergoing transformation in the process.' (II, pp. 47-49.)

In the chapters on "Comparison and Conception" and on "Thought and Language," Prof. Stout gives a clear and ample analysis of the function of images, words and gesture language. He does full justice to the importance of language in mental development. These chapters also contain sections of special interest to students of logic. In a chapter on apperception the author incorporates into his own system what seems to him to be of greatest value in the Herbartian psychology. After a chapter treating of "Belief and Imagination" in terms of their relation to activity, the work closes with a chapter on "Pleasure and Pain," defined from the same standpoint. As the author says, "The reader is already familiar with my general doctrine. . . . Our starting point lies in the concept of mental activity as the direction of mental process towards an end. . . . The antithesis between pleasure and pain is co-incident with the antithesis between free and impeded progress towards an end." (II, p. 270.) This theory is elaborated with special reference to Mr. H. R. Marshall's "Pain, Pleasure and Æsthetics."

As we conclude the work we feel that it is, as the author says, "a fragment of a larger whole," and that final judgment must be reserved until the entire work is completed. Yet the "Analytic Psychology," by itself alone, is a valuable contribution to psychological literature. The two volumes present a thorough, systematic analysis of their topics, from what we may call a *dynamic* point of view. Their author regards consciousness as essentially active and constructive; at the same time he avoids the error of referring to activity in a vague, undefined and undefinable fashion. Psychologists of every school, we think, will value the book as an important addition to the works representing the school of the apperceptionists. Its close connection with "the newer logic," though not without certain advantages, has been made too prominent, and has introduced confusion into the analysis or psychological terminology of the whole. The style is rather heavy and slow, but, as a rule, plain and well-balanced, and the terms in use are carefully defined. The book has a fair amount of illustrative matter, and a liberal range of reference to English writers. The least conclusive portion of the work, in our opinion, is the chapter on the ultimate mental functions, although just here it specially professes

to be initiating a reform. It announces that it is going to give an adequate, positive justification of its classification of ultimate mental functions, but we are unable to point to the fulfilment of the promise. In this connection, too, we are left with unanswered questions as to the author's understanding of the meaning and mutual relations of "object" or "reference to an object," mental content, process, state and attitude. The whole subject would have been clearer if it had been presented with reference to the methods of classification which this system hopes to supersede.

The book is a treatise and not a text-book. It possesses, on the whole, the solid virtues, and can dispense, without great loss, with the lighter ones that make a book popular.

It is unfortunate that where the substance and typography of the treatise are so good, the binding is not of equal quality. We are satisfied with cloth covers, but we also wish to have a secure and even binding.

ALICE J. HAMLIN.

Studies from the Yale Psychological Laboratory. Edited by EDWARD W. SCRIPTURE, Ph. D. Vol. III, 1895.

Vol. III of "Studies from the Yale Psychological Laboratory" contains an experimental research on Measurements of Illusions and Hallucinations in Normal Life by Dr. C. E. Seashore, another on Studies of Fatigue by Dr. J. M. Moore, a short report of experiments on the Reaction-time of a Dog by E. M. Weyer, and Notes on New Apparatus produced in the Yale workshop by Dr. Scripture.

Of these articles Mr. Seashore's research is the most extended and the most important contribution to psychology. It is divided into three parts. Part 1st deals with illusions of weight, and gives the results of five series of experiments, of which Series I tests the influence of size upon judgment when size is estimated by direct sight; Series II tests the persistence of the illusion; Series III the dependence of the illusion of weight upon the directness of sight; Series IV the dependence of the illusion of weight upon the senses by which knowledge of size is acquired, and Series V the illusion of weight due to the knowledge of the material of which the weights are made. Part 2nd deals with the principle of suggestion as experimentally applied to the normal presentations of sense. It is worked out in detail for hallucinations of warmth, for illusions of photometric changes in gray and white, and for hallucinations of an object, sound, touch, taste, smell and electric stimulus. Part 3rd consists of the deductions, experimental, pathological and epistemological, from Parts 1st and 2nd. The method of Mr. Seashore's research is a combination of the experimental and statistical methods, and the results have been carefully worked out.

Mr. Moore's studies in fatigue are directed toward two points, the effect of fatigue on binocular estimation of depth and the effect of fatigue on monocular estimation of depth. Both series of experiments point to the strain of attention as an important element in fatigue. The relation of atmospheric changes to fatigue and the effect of fatigue on the maximum rate of voluntary movement are also discussed.

In the work on the reaction-times of a dog the average time found was 89σ, the median 86σ, the mean variation 4σ.

In the notes on new apparatus several pieces are described, the most notable being a new pendulum chronoscope. Other pieces mentioned are a standard drum, an electric color wheel with speed indicator, color sight tester and several reaction keys.

THEODATE L. SMITH.